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NOTES

CONSTITUTIONALISM

AND

THE QUIXOTIC
Rationalism may be taken to refer to the belief that logical processes are
relevant in some discoverable way to the problems of life; that man is a rational
creature able to discover the relevancies between logic and life; that man is able
to know what actions are in his own and society's best interest; and that man is able
to realize these best interests through the use of reason in life situations. Rationalism holds that man is somehow able to submit the world to the rule of reason.
Scientific technology and constitutionalism represent two prominent areas of
rationalist effort. Scientific technology refers to a special class of rationalist efforts
by man to control his material environment. Constitutionalism refers to a special
class of rationalist efforts by man to control his social environment.
Only a few cultures have produced rationalism. But almost every culture
which has become highly articulated has produced some form of rationalism.
No previous rationalism, however, has approached the degree of refinement and
extensive application that has been known in Western culture between the
seventeenth and the twentieth century. As twentieth century Western culture
enters the stage of full-scale bureaucratization, rationalized controls are being
given more extensive application than ever before. Some general observations
about rationalism and religion will be helpful in preparing for a discussion of
rationalism and constitutional democracy.

One of the stipulated preconditions of rationalism is the assumption that it
is possible for man to manipulate his environment. All men have assumed that
their environment could be influenced, but there is a difference between manipulation and influence. One influences something which has its own will and could
do otherwise, but for the influence exerted. One manipulates something which is
not aware of the manipulation, or not able to be aware of being manipulated.
One influences other things in a relationship which is basically political. One
manipulates other things in a relationship which is basically scientific. Most men
have approached their environment in a political relationship. Primitive men
often attempt to influence their material environment politically through contracts with gods, demons, anthropomorphic spirits, and animistic nature forces.
A universe of political relationships and influences is an animistic universe in
which everything is alive and willful. Even culture "lives," and law "lives" (the
"living law" of familiar Anglo-Saxon tradition) in such a universe.
In a culture in which everything lives there is no such thing as "death" in the
modem sense of absolute nothingness. As primitive worlds are peopled with
spirits of winds and forests, they are also peopled with spirits of departed mem-
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bers. Men "die" and their death is terrible, but it is also a transition to another
mode of life. So long as this is true the persistence of life after death is observable in nature. Life after death might be called a datum of empirical "science"
in animistic cultures, and not a matter of faith.
The change occurs with the development of rationalism. For what rationalism does characteristically is to exhaust "life" from nature and from "science."
That is, rationalism creates a new form of death, a death which is a final nothingness. Rationalism thus scientifically "disproves" the possibility of life after
death. This line of argument is one of the central points in the philosophy of
Unamuno. From this he proceeds to the proposition that rationalist man, having
created life as a short interlude between two nothingnesses, concludes that this
being so, man's short interlude of life is absurd and meaningless. The absurdity
of life might not be apparent for all cultures developing rationalism, but it has
had an especially acute impact on Western man with his lingering nostalgia for
the primitive tranquillity of prior animistic beliefs. The result is that rationalistic
man, especially in his Western form, resurrects as a matter of faith the immortality he has disproved as a matter of science. It is the only thing which can
make life meaningful for him.
Even though rationalistic Western man can never convince himself of the
validity of his faith in immortality - even though he always suspects that the
belief is unwarranted by the facts - Western man collectively holds to this
faith and even creates a special God whose primary function is to insure immortality. This necessity of believing, in the face of its overwhelming improbability, is what Unamuno called the "tragic sense of life." He drove these
thoughts to their logical conclusions. One of these conclusions was that even
though faith in immortality and in God appears untenable, the necessity of this
faith is observable in all sorts of ways.
For one thing, faith in immortality is logically necessary to most men if they
are to follow a rationalistic life. This is so because life must hold some ultimate
meaning in order to warrant meeting the rigorous demands made on man by
rationalism. It is so because men who have faith in immortality and God will
behave differently because of that faith. They will engage confidently in projects
which cannot bear fruit until long after their death. The more complex Western
culture has become, the more immediately fruitless have become the functions'
of each man. Each worker in a huge rationalized enterprise must engage in functions which are pointless unless the indefinite success and survival of the enterprise (as distinguished from the people in it) appear to be important to him.
Moreover, as all life functions become more routinized and more drab, man is
increasingly dependent on elements apart from his own life functions to make his
routinized life seem valid. The conclusion follows that faith in some form of
immortality and in some form of immortality-insuring God becomes a functional
necessity for rationalistic industrial man in an even deeper sense than for other
types of men. Though such faith might be intrinsically indefensible to the rationalistic intellect, it is socially and functionally necessary to the rationalistic
intellect as a "myth" without which he could not function rationally.
Unamuno's tortured cry echoes that of Senancour's Obermann when he
writes that "if it be that nothingness is the fate which awaits us, we must not
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so act that it shall be a just fate." Each man must, according to Unamuno, play
out during his life a grim and cheerless dare to a probably nonexistent God,
proving by the excellence of his life (or the intensity of his sense of guilt) that
he does not deserve the nothingness which probably awaits him.
As one looks at such men from above, so to speak - from the philosopher's
lonely and farseeing vantage point - it is clear that although it is necessary for
men to play out this role, the role is nonetheless absurd, ludicrous, and Quixotic.
Men must tilt against sins which do not really "exist" except in the sense that
the Quixotic tilting is what creates them as sins. But as this "creation" is
necessary to man, Unamuno rescues the Quixotic role from its traditional position
as atypical, insane, and hallucinatory ludicrousness and identifies it with the
fundamental absurdity of rationalism in a life leading to nothingness. The
Quixotic thus becomes the noblest and most "rational" heroic model for rationalistic bureaucratic man.
Oedipus had revealed the form of tragedy appropriate to Hellenic man;
Sisyphus, as the archetypal Quixote, reveals the form of tragedy appropriate
to Western bureaucratic man. It follows that for men in general rationalism
and faith - or naturalism and supernaturalism - are 'not opposed, but are
mutually interdependent. Supernaturalism cannot exist without rationalistic
naturalism. Supernaturalism, immortality, and God were "created" by rationalism and depend for their continuing vitality on the maintenance of rationalism.
However, rationalism in its turn, is dependent for its validity and its functional
applicability to the problems of life on the vitality of supernaturalism. Science,
in its "collective" sense, if not in the case of each individual scientist, demands
supematuralism. This is the conclusion at which contemporary existentialism
has arrived - Christian and non-Christian alike. Existentialism says: Let us
assume that God is dead. But this makes a rational life absurd and meaningless.
What can make a rational life meaningful and valid? The answer is to live as if
there were a just God and immortality. For such beliefs validate actions which
otherwise would be absurd, but which are necessary to the enhancement of life
even if there is neither God nor immortality. "God" becomes the guarantor and
validator of rationalism. "God" becomes the projection of the functional and
structural necessities of the culture. "God" becomes the farsighted Copernican
(as distinguished from the shortsighted Ptolemaic) principle in human relations.
This is not really a novel maneuver. It is merely the social counterpart of the
maneuver by which the physical sciences developed their theoretical integrity.
The existentialist approach to the social sciences is comparable to the BaconianCartesian approach to the physical sciences, but in the opposite sense to what
is usually understood by positivism. For the theoretical foundation of the physical
sciences was the expulsion of animism ("God" as well as "life") as a principle
of causation external to the relationships under investigation. "God" was supplanted by a theoretically autonomous independent variable intrinsic to the system
of relationships. Though often incapable of being perfectly understood, such
principles - gravity and evolution are examples - made possible the solution of
theoretical problems not previously solvable.
In theology as well there is some reason for suggesting that the existentialist
maneuver is quite old. Several years ago, in Persecution and the Art of Writing,
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Leo Strauss investigated the esoteric tradition in Judaic philosophy attempting
to prove the presence of a consistent unwritten teaching. Though he presented
evidence which warranted assuming the presence and consistency of the tradition,
Leo Strauss remained true to the teaching he had uncovered and did not reveal
the content of the esoteric teaching. His own book continues the tradition with
which it deals and is in this sense comparable to the documents in esoteric
Judaism. And if Persecution and the Art of Writing is submitted to the same
analytical scrutiny that its author gave to the Judaic esoteric tradition, one way
of solving the puzzle of the book is to interpret esoteric Judaism as containing
the existentialist teaching that even though a religious ethic cannot be grounded
on a belief in God, it may be validated as a necessity of existence. It was this
train of thought which led Unamuno to agree with A. J. Balfour's proposition
that although each society must re-create in its members the ethic essential to its
preservation, highly rationalistic cultures create conditions such that the denial
of ethical validity in general may become widespread. In becoming widespread
it destroys the foundations of high culture. Balfour and Unamuno call the
anomic destroyers of ethics "parasites": "sheltered by convictions which belong,
not to them, but to the society of which they form a part; . . . nourished by a
process in which they take no share. And when those convictions decay, and
those processes come to an end, the alien life which they have maintained can
scarce be expected to outlast them."

Conceptions similar to these apply also to the Heavenly City on earth: the
world of rationalist constitutionalism. Rationalism has come into such ill repute
during the twentieth century that discussions concerning it have come to have a
slightly archaic aura. Belief in rationalism, like belief in supernaturalism, has
been scientifically undermined. Since the nineteenth century there has developed
an entire family of social sciences which proceed from assumptions of irrational or
nonrational behavior. These newer social sciences are rationalistic and scientific
in themselves, so they are not opposed to science as such. They are opposed only
to the rationalistic social sciences which were founded on the assumption that
man himself tends to behave rationally and scientifically. Democracy and constitutionalism, which were founded on rationalistic assumptions about human
behavior, appear to be discredited by discoveries that man is predominantly an
irrational, or nonrational, animal.
In the wake of these newer social sciences another development occurred.
Not only was there the novel discovery of a substratum of human irrationality;
there was also a considerable redefinition of rational behavior. For example,
when one looks at human behavior from an assumption of irrational behaviorism,
all behavior appears to be irrational, and even compulsive. All behavior can in
theory be traced back to some stimulus-response on the individual level, and/or
a conformity-or-aggression response to cultural norms on the social level. Behavior which once would have been deemed eminently rational and logical becomes converted into individually or culturally determined behavior which is then
rationalized by the human mind. This leads into the social science variant of
the old free will-determinism problem.
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For example, classical economic theory contained the famous economic man
assumption. It was assumed that men in general strove rationally to better themselves economically. Even in the beginning this was recognized as being a distortion and an oversimplification. But it was believed to be sufficiently true of
empirical behavior to be valid as a tenet of operational theory.
There are two points to be made here. In the first place, it seems true that
during the eighteenth and the nineteenth century men actually did behave more
in accordance with the economic man assumption than they did before or after.
The empirical situation is different in the twentieth century from what it was in
the eighteenth and the nineteenth. One need only compare the nineteenth
century Horatio Alger literature with the twentieth century Organization Man
literature to get a quick illustration of the empirical differences in behavior
between the two periods.
Secondly, the same behavior is interpreted and evaluated differently in the
two periods. The industrial moguls of the nineteenth century - men like
Andrew Carnegie, Jay Gould, John D. Rockefeller, J. P. Morgan, and Henry
Ford - appeared in their times to be eminently rational economic men. But
twentieth, century biographies of these men invariably portray them as compulsively psychopathic and culturally determined illustrations of the behavioral
determinism characteristic of their times. A man who, in the twentieth century,
behaves like a nineteenth century economic man tends to be regarded as being
sick and needful of psychiatric care. Such a man, told he is sick at every hand,
tends to believe himself to be sick also, and goes dutifully to a psychiatrist seeking a cure for his strange and compulsive economic behavior.
The same thing is true in politics. The greatest twentieth century biographies
of eighteenth and nineteenth century political leaders "explain" their strange
and compulsive behavior according to the "psychopathology of politics." Such
are the conclusions of prominent studies of Napoleon, Alexander Hamilton,
Abraham Lincoln, William Jennings Bryan, and Woodrow Wilson.
In the twentieth century we apply to mass behavior the same approach. Studies in the behavioral sciences reveal that when the same commodity is packaged
in several different colors housewives will uniformly choose one color over the
others. When asked why, they will reply that they prefer the product chosen
and think it is "better" than its differently colored competitors. Students in the
behavioral sciences conclude that this consumer behavior is "irrational," even
though the consumers are obviously making preferential choices on the basis of
the only distinctions available to them - behaving in a perfectly rational manner
from one point of view. Yet, so widespread is the conviction that consumer
behavior is fundamentally irrational that consumers in general come also to believe that they behave irrationally.
A comparable development has occurred in mass politics. Modem democratic and constitutional theory was founded on the assumption that the average
man would behave rationally in politics: he would study the issues presented by
candidates and participate actively in political affairs. There appears to have
been considerable validity for these assumptions during parts of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. However, the twentieth century has brought almost
complete disillusionment to students of political behavior. Political apathy is
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widespread. Interest in and knowledge about political candidates and issues is
absent. Voters, like consumers, tend to choose candidates on the basis of their
positions on the ballot or the ethnic connotations of their names. Voters tend
to behave conservatively during good times and radically during bad times. If
a crisis occurs, whoever is in office is likely to be deposed regardless of his connection with the crisis. If the weather is dismal on election day the "ins" will
fare worse than if the day is bright and cheerful. People in general know that
politics is often controlled by bosses who short-circuit the functioning of democratic institutions. Yet voters rarely exhibit any dissatisfaction with boss control,
and they seldom display any real devotion to democratic principles. In the
twentieth century democratic theory appears to have lost all foundation in theory
and practice.
However, this too is partly a matter of appearances rather than of reality.
In most elections the difference between the candidates is like the difference
between boxes of soap on a grocery shelf. The general cultural homogeneity
of the people and the selection and filtration system at work in political parties
have seen to that. To become fanatically aroused over the normal American
election would be quite irrational. The fact that most voters answer "don't know"
to public opinion polls about issues such as inflation and foreign policy is as much
a testament to their integrity as it is a revelation of political apathy. All educators know that even their brightest scholars will forget important facts and specific
analyses shortly after their examinations are over. To expect average voters to
keep complex public issues in the forefront of their minds is in itself irrational.
Nor does the fact that voters appear uninformed according to public opinion
polls mean necessarily that they will behave irrationally on election day. For in
some cases mass information will become sharpened just before election day, as
does the information of scholars just before an examination. But in most cases
this is not what happens. For the voter tends to realize that no matter how much
he studies a complex political issue he will still not be able to master it. As a
result his vote may be decided on other criteria. He may "anthropomorphize"
the issues presented to him, interpreting them on the basis of his reaction to the
characters and personalities of the antagonists on both sides of the question. But
usually he does neither. Usually the characters and personalities of the competing candidates are not markedly different. In such a case the average citizen
either stays at home on election day, or votes as he has in the past. His judgment
is that either way it will not make a great deal of difference, and so he engages
in a form of "coin flipping" by staying at home; or he follows the only attraction
the process offers him: "betting" on the "team" he has grown to identify himself with.
Nonetheless, it is clear that rationalistic constitutional theory expected too
much of the human being. People are incapable of and uninterested in living
up to the requirements demanded of them in theory. And even if this were not
true, constitutionalism still would not work according to theory, for constitutional
systems do not present people with operating conditions conducive to the mass
exercise of rationality in politics.
Developments comparable to this had also occurred in the democracies of
Athens and Rome. In these, as in the twentieth century democracies, the con-
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viction that democracy was unworkable became widespread. Political, economic,
and military emergencies contributed to the success of anti-democratic movements. The conditions which had been devised to foster' activist political rationalism failed in that task and instead permitted the growth of irrationalist
and anti-democratic movements. However, none of the complex cultures which
abandoned democracy long survived that abandonment.
One reason for this is that complex, highly articulated cultures must elicit
the rational and creative participation and coordination of large numbers of
people in order to function well. The most efficient device for achieving this has
always been some form of democracy. The only alternatives are the dictatorial
application of police terror and the maintenance of aggressive militarism. Terror
and militarism are functional over a long period only if they can provide material
progress for the culture. However, in mass cultures, which have previously
developed highly articulated and rationalized conditions under democratic institutions, this has proved almost impossible to achieve because of the inordinate
investment which must be made in maintaining large terrorist and military organizations. There is some evidence that twentieth century innovations in the
behavioral sciences and behavioral drugs may render the manipulation of masses
of people in a bureaucratic culture more economic, but this has yet to be demonstrated. In the present state of the arts of organizing and controlling large numbers of people in highly complex cultures it is still true that anti-democratic institutions are dysfunctional. Yet, as we have seen, democratic cultures contain
conditions which tend to produce anti-democratic movements. There is in this
a social paradox analogous to the ethical paradox previously attributed to Balfour
and Unamuno.
The survival of a highly complex rationalistic culture requires that it maintain
the vitality of democratic institutions, and yet democracies produce environments
conducive to the discreditation of democracy and the development and success
of anti-democratic movements. This raises a further question. Is it possible that
in such cultures belief in democratic rationality must be maintained as a myth,
if nothing else, in order for them to be preserved and to flourish?
We are familiar with the Sorelian argument about myth. It was based upon
the assumption that collectively men do not engage in rational behavior. After
analyzing the Christian revolution Sorel concluded that its appeal had been
irrational rather than rational. And yet, because men in general came to believe
in the irrational tenets of Christianity, the Christian revolution succeeded. Sorel
applied this same line of reasoning to the socialist revolution and argued that the
workers would not respond to rationalistic revolutionary programs of the sort
being devised by the socialist intellectuals of his day, but instead would respond
to an irrational program - a secular-socialist counterpart to the Christian myth.
The myth of the general strike was to take the place of the chiliastic Christian
paradise. The general strike was irrational and empirically unrealizable, but in
Sorelian theory this was the source of its mass efficacy. Masses could be galvanized into revolutionary action by faith in an unrealizable irrational creed, not
by conviction of the practicability of a rational program. Mannheim's analysis
of the creative function of utopian theory had a similar foundation. A variation
of these approaches can be applied to rational participational democracy.
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Actual practices in democracies appear to demonstrate that masses are incapable of behaving according to the "myth" of rational participational democracy. In fact, seen from a deterministic, behaviorist viewpoint, all rational action
tends to dissolve into irrational behavior. However, much the same behavior
may also be interpreted from a rationalist point of view. We have already considered examples of this for economic and political behavior.
Moreover, it makes a difference in the behavior of individuals in a culture
how their culture interprets their behavior. In a slave culture with a slave
morality, individuals tend to behave like slaves. In a free culture with a rationalist
morality, individuals tend to behave like free and rational men. The human being is often capable of doing "impossible" tasks if he believes that he can and
should do them. This is the basis on which morale is engendered in all organizations.
There seems little doubt that in eighteenth century America - the America
that made the Federalist Papers into best sellers - there was a much higher
level of mass rational political participation than there is in twentieth century
America. Men were no different then, save for their belief in rationalism. We
now claim that the rationalism they believed in was a myth. But as with myths
in general, it was a self-fulfilling myth. The belief tended to elicit the behavior
it described.
When science and religion are viewed from Unamuno's standpoint their opposition disappears and they become mutually interdependent. Similarly, deterministic behaviorism and rational participational democracy are also mutually
interdependent.
Mass cultures cannot persist except through some form of democratic consent;
social science cannot persist except in some form of constitutional order. Though
from one aspect the social sciences concerned with irrational behavior tell us
that constitutional democracy is empirically unrealizable, from another aspect
they teach us that constitutional democracy is a functional necessity and can find
approximate realization as a vital myth.
We may call this the "utopian" sense of constitutionalism: constitutionalism
as a self-fulfilling myth which can be approximated if it is believed in and which
is to that extent "scientifically" valid. Constitutionalism and the rationalistic
tradition of the "Higher Law" have a relationship to the social sciences comparable to that of God to the physical sciences before Bacon and Descartes.
Scientifically we can prove that they do not "exist." Yet the social sciences also
teach us the existential and functional validity of such principles as myths. To
believe in and to follow the tenets of constitutionalism is as Quixotic as to
believe in God and immortality. But it is equally necessary, especially when considered collectively. This is not the same as saying that one must believe in constitutionalism "because it is impossible." On the contrary, as with belief in sin,
believing and acting on beliefs "creates" the object of belief. 'Even if there
were no such thing as rational constitutionalism, bureaucratic man would have
to invent it in order to make his complex culture work.'
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